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A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

Justice McHugh wrote in Clark v. KawasakiMotors Corp., U.S.A. 0 31 that
[i]n reducing a jury verdict in a negligence action by the amount
of the plaintiff's prior settlement with a joint tortfeasor, in light of
the percentage of the plaintiff's comparative negligence later
found by the jury at trial, this Court adopts the "settlement first,"
rather than the "fault first" method; under the "settlement first"
method, the trial court in making the reduction first credits the
amount of the prior settlement against the jury verdict, and then
reduces the remainder by the percentage of the plaintiff's
comparative negligence; whereas, under the "fault first" method,
the trial court in making the reduction first reduces the jury verdict
by the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence, and then 2credits
against the remainder the amount of the prior settlement.i03
Justice McHugh held in Andrews v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital, Inc.'03
that
[a] jury award for the lost future earnings of an infant, in a
negligence action alleging that the infant's death resulted from
medical malpractice committed with regard to the mother's labor
and delivery of the child, will not be set aside by this Court as
speculative: (1) where the award of lost future earnings is within
the range of estimated future earnings, based upon various life
scenarios, reduced to present value, established by the expert
testimony of an economist at trial and (2) where the economic and
medical evidence of the plaintiff at trial indicates that the infant in
question, though born prematurely, would statistically have had an
average life expectancy and an average work life expectancy, but
for the alleged medical malpractice. 03 4
XVI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A.

State Civil Service Commission

Justice McHugh struck a balance between technical error and substantial
compliance with administrative procedural rules in Vosberg v. Civil Service
Commission of West Virginia.'0 It was held:
1031

490 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 1997).

1032

Idi at Syl. Pt. 3.

1033

499 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1997).

1034

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1035

275 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1981).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 20
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

Where a state employee, covered by civil service W. Va. Code, ch.
29, art. 6, has instituted a grievance pursuant to a state personnel
grievance procedure and the employee's supervisor violates the
grievance procedure, such violation will not result in the reversal
of an order by the West Virginia Civil Service Commission
affirming the employee's dismissal from employment, where such
violation of the grievance procedure is merely technical, following
substantial compliance with the procedure, and there has existed
between the employee and his supervisors ongoing
communications concerning the employee's employment
problems.1 °36
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Ginsberg v. West Virginia Civil
Service Commission1037 that "[a] classified civil service employee who is

suspended from his employment for thirty10 days
or less is not entitled to an appeal to
38
the West Virginia Civil Service System.,
0 39

Relying upon the opinion in Caldwell v. Civil Service Commission,
Justice McHugh held in West Virginia Department of Health v. Mathison1 04 ° that

[t]he abolition of a position, covered by the Civil Service System,
pursuant to the reorganization of a unit of state government is
proper when it is shown to have been made to meet changing
needs or to promote efficiency in government and has been
approved by the Civil Service System.' 04 '
In Barnes v. Public Service Commission,1 04 2 Justice McHugh held that

"W.Va. Code, 29-6-15 (1977) authorizes the Civil Service Commission to award
attorney fees to a civil service employee as a remedy where the action taken by the
appointing authority was too severe but was with good cause. ' "'M
Justice McHugh stated in American Federation of State, County &
Municipal Employees v. Civil Service Commission of West Virginia'04 4 that

[w]here employees of the Department of Human Services of West
1036

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1037

294 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1982).

1038

Id. at Syl.

1039

184 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1971).

1040

301 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1983).

1041

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
304 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1983).

1042
1043

Id. at Syl.

1044

324 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 1984).
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Virginia were classified for purposes of civil service as Economic
Service Worker I or II, and the work performed by those
employees was not distinguished by the Department of Human
Services from the work performed by an Economic Service
Worker IHI (a higher salaried position), such employees were
entitled to the difference in compensation between their Economic
Service Worker I or II classifications
and the Economic Service
1 45
Worker El classification. 0
B.

Health CarePeerReview Organization

Justice McHugh addressed several issues concerning health care peer
review organizations in Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital
Ass'n 1 46 The court initially held that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 30-3C-2(a) [1980], individuals providing
information to any review organization may not be shielded from
civil liability when they provide information that is: (1) unrelated
to the performance of the duties and functions of such review
organization; and (2) false, and the person providing such
information knew, or had reason to believe, that such information
was false. Thus, individuals conducting health care peer review
must act in good faith in order to be statutorily immunized from
civil liability under W.Va. Code, 30-3C-2 [1980].0 47
The court in Garrisonheld next that
[t]he public policy in favor of full disclosure encourages
individuals to provide "good-faith health care peer review."
Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 185 W.Va. 59, 65,
404 S.E.2d 750, 756, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 863, 112 S.Ct. 185,
116 L.Ed.2d 146 (1991). Thus, an agreement wherein a hospital
agrees not to fully disclose truthful and pertinent information
about a physician to a peer review organization would violate the
public policy in favor of full disclosure. Conversely, an agreement
by a hospital not to disclose information about a physician which
is known to be false would not violate the public policy in favor of
full disclosure. 1 48

1045

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1046

438 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).

1047

Id. at Syl. PL 1.

1048

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Health Care Cost Review Authority

Justice McHugh clarified the duties of the Health Care Cost Review
Authority in its determination of applications for certificates of need in the case of
United HospitalCenter, Inc. v. Richardson.'°49 The court held initially that

[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 16-29B-11 [1983], the West Virginia
Health Care Cost Review Authority was designated this State's
public health planning and development agency, which agency
has the responsibility of administering the West Virginia public
health certificate of need program, W.Va. Code, 16-2D-1 [1977],
et seq.; in particular, the duties of the planning and development
agency include the determination of the completeness of, the
review of and the rendering of a final decision upon certificate of
need applications for new institutional health services.'050
The court in Richardsonnext held that
[w]here an applicant sought a certificate of need under the
provisions of W.Va. Code, 16-2D-1 [1977], et seq., for the
acquisition of a medical diagnostic service known as a mobile
magnetic resonance imaging ["MRI"] unit, the West Virginia
public health planning and development agency was required
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 16-2D-7(f) [1981], to determine the
completeness of the applicant's application within fifteen days of
the agency's receipt of the application, and the action of the
agency in imposing a "moratorium" upon the determination of
completeness of that, and similar, applications, in order that
standards for the processing of "MRI" applications could be
developed, was arbitrary and capricious, in view of existing
statutes and legislative rules allowing opportunity for the
development of "MRI" standards during the agency's regular
review process.' 0 5'
D.

Division of EnvironmentalProtection

In Ooten v. Faerber,1052 Justice McHugh held:
Where consideration of the reinstatement of an area deleted from a
surface-mining permit is conditioned upon (1) completion of
1049

328 S.E.2d 195 (W. Va. 1985).

1050

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1051

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

1052

383 S.E.2d 774 (W. Va. 1989).
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mining and reclamation on a significant portion of the approved
area and upon (2) a further determination of the possible effect of
mining on the deleted area, there must be compliance with both of
these conditions, including revegetation, prior to reinstatement,
unless the
1053 permit conditions are modified in accordance with the

statute.'

Justice McHugh said in State ex rel. Laurel Mountain/FellowsvilleArea
Clean Watershed Ass'n v. Callaghan1054 that "[w]hen the language of a regulation
promulgated pursuant to the West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Act,
W.Va. Code, 22A-3-1 et seq., is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the
regulation is to be accepted and followed without resorting to the rules of
interpretation or construction. '' 1055 The court ruled that "[p]ursuant to 38 C.S.R.
Sec. 2-12.4(c) (1991), the Commissioner of the Division of Environmental
Protection has a duty to utilize the proceeds from forfeited bonds to accomplish the
completion of reclamation of affected lands of a surface mine." 10 56
In Curnutte v. Callaghan,'0 57 Justice McHugh stated that "[u]nder the
definition of valid existing rights for haul roads provided in 38 W.Va.C.S.R. Sec.
2-2.129 (1992), a permit applicant may establish valid existing rights for a coal
haul road if the applicant demonstrates that the proposed road was in existence
prior to August 3, 1977. "1058
In the case of State ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v.
West VirginiaDivision of EnvironmentalProtection,'0 59 Justice McHugh wrote that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 22A-3-11(g) [1990] and 38
W.Va.C.S.R. Sec. 2-12.4(d) (1991), the West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection has a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty
to utilize moneys from the Special Reclamation Fund, up to
[twenty-five percent] of the annual amount, to treat acid mine
drainage at bond forfeiture sites when the proceeds from forfeited
bonds are less than the actual cost of reclamation. However, when
the cost of treating acid mine drainage at these sites is greater than
the amount of funds available in the Special Reclamation Fund,
the Division of Environmental Protection may expend the
available funds in the Special Reclamation Fund at the highest

1053

a at Syl. Pt. 2.

1054

418 S.E.2d 580 (W. Va. 1992).

1055

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1056

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

1057

425 S.E.2d 170 (W. Va. 1992).

1058

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1059

447 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1994).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 20
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

priority sites.""
Justice McHugh wrote in State ex rel. East End Ass 'n v. McCoy10 61 that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 22-15-10(b) [1994], it is unlawful for any
person, unless the person holds a valid permit from the division of
environmental protection to install, establish, construct, modify,
operate or abandon any solid waste facility. All approved solid
waste facilities shall be installed, established, constructed,
modified, operated or abandoned in accordance with this article,
plans, specifications, orders, instructions and rules in effect. A
person who obtains a construction permit from the Division of
Environmental Protection under W.Va. Code, 22-5-11 [1994] of
the West Virginia Air Pollution Control Act to construct a medical
waste incinerator is not required to also obtain a construction
permit for that purpose under W.Va. Code, 22-15-10(b) [1994].1 °62
In West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection v. Kingwood Coal
Co., 0 6 3 Justice McHugh stated that "[a]ppeals of a final agency decision issued by

the director of the division of environmental protection shall be heard de novo by
the surface mine board as required by W.Va. Code, 22B-1-7(e) [1994]. The board is
not required to afford any deference to the DEP decision but shall act
independently on the evidence before it. ' 10 64
E.

Division of Personnel

Justice McHugh restricted the authority of the Division of Personnel in
grievance proceedings in the case of Parsons v. West Virginia Bureau of
Employment Programs, Workers' Compensation Division.0 65 The court initially
stated that "[t]he Division of Personnel has no jurisdiction to hear or decide
misclassification grievances at level three of the Grievance Procedure for State
Employees set forth in W.Va. Code, 29-6A-1, et seq., except in those instances
where the Division of Personnel is the employing agency."' 10 66 The court next held
that
[t]he legislature has statutorily mandated that the Division of
1060

Id. at Syl.

1061

481 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1996).

1062

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1063

490 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1997).

1064

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1065

428 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1993).

1066

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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Personnel has the discretion of becoming a party at level three of
the Grievance Procedure for State Employees, and as a party at
level three of the grievance procedure the consent of the Division
of Personnel is needed before the relief requested can be modified
under W.Va. Code, 29-6A-3(k) [1988].'067

F.

Departmentof Healthand Human Resources

Justice McHugh addressed the protocol for working with infectious
medical waste in State ex reL EastEnd Ass'n v. McCoy.'0 6 He said that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 20-5J-5(b) [1991] and 64 C.S.R. 56-4.1
[1993] no person may own, construct, modify, operate or close an
infectious medical waste management facility without first
obtaining a permit from the secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Resources. According to 64 C.S.R. 56-4.4.4 [1993],
an infectious medical waste management facility permit
application must include, among other information, a proposed
infectious medical waste management plan. The secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Resources must approve this
plan before he or she grants a permit to own, construct, modify,
operate 10 or
close an infectious medical waste management
69
facility.
The court next held that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 20-5J-6(a)(9) [1994], the secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Resources shall promulgate
legislative rules in accordance with the provisions of W. Va. Code,
29A-1-1, et seq. necessary to effectuate the findings and purposes
of the West Virginia Medical Waste Act, W.Va. Code, 20-5J-1, et
seq. These rules shall include, but not be limited to, procedures for
public participation in the implementation of this article. W.Va.
Code, 20-5J-6(a)(9) [1994] requires the secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Resources to promulgate
legislative rules setting forth procedures for public participation in
the permit application process of noncommercial infectious
medical waste management facilities.'0 70

1067

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1068

481 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1996).

1069

Id at Syl. Pt. 4.

1070

Id.at Syl. Pt.5.
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Division of Human Services

Justice McHugh addressed an aspect of the method used by, what is now
the division of human services, in determining food stamp eligibility in the case of
Bragg v. Ginsberg.0 71 The court held:
In establishing the value of a licensed vehicle of a household as a
financial resource in determining whether the household's
financial resources, or assets, exceeded the limits of eligibility for
food stamps under the federal Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C.
Sec. 2011 [1977], et seq., for which food stamps the household
applied in May, 1977, the West Virginia Department of Human
Services (then the "West Virginia Department of Welfare") was
required, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(g) [1977], and applicable
federal and state regulations, to determine the "fair market value"
of the motor vehicle, and that fair market value was to be
determined by the West Virginia Department of Human Services
10 72
by assigning to the vehicle the vehicle's "wholesale value.,
H.

Division of Health
In

Citizens

Concerned About

Valley

Mental Health Center v.

10 73 Justice McHugh clarified
Hansbarger,
the authority of what is now the Division
of Health and the Board of Health. The court noted initially that "[t]he West
Virginia Department of Health through its Board of Health and Director has a duty
to insure the effective delivery of mental health services in this State."10 74 Justice
McHugh held next that

[t]he discretion of the board of directors of comprehensive
community mental health-mental retardation centers, such as
Valley Comprehensive Community Mental Health Center, to
determine the nature of mental health services which such centers
provide to the communities they serve is circumscribed by
guidelines and standards established by the State of West Virginia
and, in particular, by the West Virginia Department of Health;
those guidelines and standards are reflected (1) in the provisions
of W.Va. Code, 27-2A-1 [1977], which statute enumerates various
requirements for the licensure of comprehensive community
mental health-mental retardation centers, (2) in the rules and
regulations relating to such centers promulgated by the Board of
1071

314 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1984).

1072

Id. at Syl.

1073

309 S.E.2d 17 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1074
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Health of the West Virginia Department of Health and (3) in other
matters, including lease and service contract agreements between
the State of West Virginia and comprehensive community mental
health-mental retardation centers and state monitoring or
07 5
evaluation of such centers."
The court in Hansbargerconcluded by stating:
The Director of the West Virginia Department of Health has the
power by statute to enforce the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Board of Health, and the Director of the West Virginia
Department of Health and certain others have the power by statute
to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings concerning matters
covered by the laws of this State pertaining to public health and
within the authority of the Board of Health, and the rules,
076
regulations and orders of the Board.'
L

Department of Education

1 77
That court held in State ex rel. Wilson v. Truby " that "[p]ursuant to Part
Ill of the West Virginia Department of Education Employee Handbook, applicants
for a vacant
within the Department who have met the objective eligibility criteria
' 10 78
position.'
such
for
interview
professional position are entitled to an
Justice McHugh examined implementation of A Master Plan for Public
79
Education in Pauley v. Bailey."' The court initially held that

[t]he West Virginia Board of Education and the State
Superintendent of Schools, pursuant to their general supervisory
powers over education in West Virginia under W.Va. Const. art.
XII, Sec. 2, and their specific duties to establish, implement and
enforce high quality educational standards for all facets of
education under the provisions of Chapter 18 of the West Virginia
Code, have a duty to ensure the complete executive delivery and
maintenance of a "thorough and efficient system of free schools"
in West Virginia as that system is embodied in A Master Plan for
Public Education which plan was proposed by agencies of the
executive branch and found constitutionally acceptable by the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County and that plan will be enforced
until such time as it is altered or modified by this Court or the
1075

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1076

Id. at Syl. Pt 3.

1077

281 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1981).

1078

Id. at Syl. Pt 3.

1079

324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984).
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circuit court.1 °80
The court in Pauley then held:
Board Policies Secs. 2510 and 2321 of the West Virginia Board of
Education, standing alone, do not comply with the statutory duty
of the West Virginia Board of Education, under W.Va. Code,
18-9A-22 [1981], to establish quality educational standards for the
operation of the county school systems in West Virginia, nor will
such policies comply with the duty of the West Virginia Board of
Education, under the 1984 amended version of that statute, to
establish "high quality" educational standards for the operation of
the county school systems in West Virginia as such standards are
detailed in A Master Plan for Public Education. 081
In Miller v. Board of Education of County of Boone,108 2 Justice McHugh
stated that "W.Va. Code, 18A-2-8a [1977] does not require the board of education
or superintendent to take some affirmative action before the first Monday in May
when not rehiring probationary employees." 103
J.

Departmentof Motor Vehicles

The court in Wells v. Roberts1°0 4 looked at the issue of mandatory
revocation of a driver's license. Justice McHugh indicated initially that
"[m]andatory administrative revocation of an operator's license, without an
administrative hearing, under W.Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has been a prior
hearing and conviction on the underlying criminal charge, does not deny the person
whose license is so revoked due process of law." 1085 The court in Wells then held:
W.Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for a mandatory revocation of an
operator's license upon receipt of a record of conviction of a
specified offense when that conviction has become final. That
section does not provide for an administrative hearing either
before or after the revocation, but, rather, for "forthwith"
revocation. W.Va. Code, 17B-3-6, on the other hand, provides for
discretionary suspension of an operator's license where there is
evidence that the licensee has committed a specified offense. That
1080

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1081

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1082

437 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1993).

1083

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1084

280 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1981).

1085

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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section does provide for an administrative hearing upon request
may be rescinded, extended or changed
after which the10suspension
86
to a revocation.
The court addressed the degree of evidence necessary in a license
suspension hearing in Ours v. West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.10 87
Justice McHugh held that
[r]eports prepared by a police officer investigating an automobile
accident and reports prepared by persons involved in such
accident may not be the sole evidence upon which the
Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles bases a
determination, after a suspension hearing conducted pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 17D-3-15 [1972], that there is a "reasonable
possibility of judgment" against a driver or owner of a vehicle
involved in the accident and from whom security for that accident
has been required pursuant to the10 88provisions of chapter 17D,
article 3 of the West Virginia Code.
In Kimes v. Bechtold, °8 9 Justice McHugh held that "W.Va. Code,
17C-5A-3 [1983], read in pari materia with W.Va. Code, 17C-5-7 [1983], does not
authorize the early reissuance of a license to operate a motor vehicle, after the
successful completion of an alcoholism educational, treatment or rehabilitation
program, where the license had been revoked for a first refusal to submit to a
designated secondary chemical test." 10 90
K.

Boardof Optometry

Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving the state board of
optometry in the case of Serian v. State By & Through West Virginia Board of,
Optometry.'0 9' The first issue concerned the power of the board to act when all its
members were not appointed. Justice McHugh wrote:
Where appointments of lay persons by the governor of this State
to the West Virginia Board of Optometry pursuant to W.Va. Code,
30-1-4a [1977], had not been made, the West Virginia Board of
Optometry, nevertheless, had jurisdiction to conduct license
1088

Id. at Syl. PL 1.

1087

315 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1984).

1088

l

1089

342 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1986).

1090

Id. at Syl. PL 2.

1091

297 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1982).

at Syl. Pt. 1.
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revocation proceedings against an optometrist practicing in this
State, where the record indicated that, pursuant to W.Va. Code,
30-1-5 [1931], a quorum of board members existed during 0the
92
transaction of business relating to such revocation proceedings.'
The next issue the court resolved in Serian concerned the board of
optometry's adherence to a specific notice requirement in its rules and regulations.
Justice McHugh held that
[w]here the rules and regulations of the West Virginia Board of
Optometry required that an optometrist charged with a violation of
the optometry laws of this State be provided in writing with a list
of persons, if any, who witnessed the alleged violation, such rules
and regulations were complied with by the West Virginia Board of
Optometry, where the written notices of hearing before the board
upon the violation provided the names of persons who complained
against the optometrist concerning the violation, and the testimony
of other persons against the optometrist whose names were not
provided in the notices or in any other document prior to the
hearing was not considered by the board.'0 93
Justice McHugh continued in Serian by addressing the presumptive
impartiality of practicing optometrist to be members of the board of optometry. The
court stated that
[t]he fact that members of the West Virginia Board of Optometry
or members of board committees are practicing optometry in this
State does not ordinarily suggest that such board or committee
members have a pecuniary interest of sufficient substance to
disqualify them from participating in license revocation
10 94
proceedings against an optometrist also practicing in this State.
The final matter taken up by Justice McHugh in Serian involved the
interchange of roles by members of the board of optometry. The court stated:
License revocation proceedings before the West Virginia Board of
Optometry, wherein charges filed against an optometrist
practicing in this State were investigated, heard and evaluated
before the board and its appointed committee, did not violate due
process per se through the alleged mixing of the roles of

1092

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1093

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1094

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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0 95

complainant or prosecutor and judge.'
L.

PublicService Commission

In West Virginia-Citizen Action Group v. Public Service Commission of
West Virginia,10 96 Justice McHugh addressed several matters involving the
authority of the Public Service Commission. The court initially held that "[t]he
Public Service Commission was created by the Legislature for the purpose of
exercising regulatory authority over public utilities. Its function is to require such
entities to perform in a manner designed to safeguard the interests of the public and
the utilities. Its primary purpose is to serve the interests of the public."''0 97 The
court next examined the authority of the Public Service Commission regarding a
specific issue. It was stated that
[w]here a public utility communicates, through its billing process,
with its customers upon matters concerning the costs customers
must bear if certain legislation concerning utilities is enacted into
law, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia has
jurisdiction under its authority to (1) safeguard the interests of the
public, and (2) regulate the "practices, services and rates of public
utilities," to establish methods by which the utility's customers
may receive
contrasting or opposing viewpoints concerning such
1 0 98
costs.

Justice McHugh in Citizen Action Group concluded that
[w]here a public utility placed in its monthly billing envelopes
mailed to its customers an insert which stated that electric bills
will "increase sharply" if certain legislation before the United
States Congress, concerning utilities, is enacted into law, the
Public Service Commission of West Virginia had jurisdiction to
require that a subsequent mailing of the utility's billing envelopes
contain the insert of an appropriate spokesman, setting forth
contrasting or opposing viewpoints to the utility's insert. 0 99
In Stephens v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,"0 0 Justice
McHugh addressed a common carrier's efforts to obtain lawful authority to operate
1095

I&at Syl.Pt. 4.

1096

330 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1985).

1097

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1098

Id.at Syl. PL 2.

1099

Il at Syl. Pt. 3.

11GO

356 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1987).
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in the state, after having previously operated unlawfully in the state. The court held
that
[i]f a common carrier by motor vehicle willfully operates
unlawfully within this State by not first having applied for and
obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 24A-2-5 [1980], and that common carrier
subsequently applies for a certificate, the Public Service
Commission may not base its findings that the public convenience
and necessity require the proposed service or any part thereof on
evidence relating to such unlawful operations." °'
Justice McHugh held in Blennerhassett Historical Park Commission v.
Public Service Commission of West Virginia"1 0 2 that "[t]he river transportation

service on the Ohio River from Point Park in Parkersburg, West Virginia to
Blennerhassett Island is a ferry service and, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 24-2-1 [1983],
is a public utility subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission."" 3
In Consumer Advocate Division of Public Service Commission of West
Virginia v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,'1°4 Justice McHugh

addressed the ability of the Public Service Commission to alter laws. The court
held that "[a] statute, or an administrative rule, may not, under the guise of
'interpretation,' be modified, revised, amended or rewritten."" 0 5 Justice McHugh
ruled that
[w]here a rule of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia
authorizes a waiver of such rule in the event that a provision of the
rule would result in "undue hardship," this Court, upon appeal
from a final order of the Commission waiving such rule due to
"hardship," will remand the case for the Commission to follow its
rule by finding whether10 6an "undue hardship" would result from
application of the rule.
Justice McHugh examined the authority of the Public Service Commission
to grant certificates to radio carriers in the case of Capitol Radiotelephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission of West Virginia. 1107 He stated the following:
1101

Id. at Syl.

1102

366 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1988).

1103

Id. at Syl.

1104

386 S.E.2d 650 (W. Va. 1989).

1105

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1106

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1107

404 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1991).
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In a case where a radio common carrier seeks a certificate of
public convenience and necessity pursuant to the provisions of
W.Va. Code, 24-2-11 [19831, the Public Service Commission must
place the burden of proof upon the applicant in establishing that
public convenience and necessity do exist. However, the Public
Service Commission is not required to consider the effect of
granting such certificate on existing radio common carriers. When
such public convenience and necessity is properly shown, it is not
error for the Public Service Commission
to grant a certificate of
108
public convenience and necessity.
The issue confronting Justice McHugh in Casey v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia"0 9 involved the authority of the Public Service
Commission to intervene in interstate telephone billing disputes. The court held:
Where a billing dispute arises between an interstate telephone
company and a customer concerning interstate telephone calls,
which interstate calls are regulated by the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Federal Communications
Commission has an on-going procedure for the resolution of such
disputes, the Communications Act of 1934, set forth in 47 U.S.C.
Sec. 151, et seq., preempts the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission of West Virginia to resolve such interstate telephone
billing disputes, even though the Federal Communications
Commission deferred to the states the determination of whether
and under what circumstances local exchange carriers will be
allowed to offer disconnection for nonpayment services to the
interstate telephone company.Il
Justice McHugh wrote in City of Kenova v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia,
Inc."" that
[i]n the event that a conflict arises between county commissions,
between telephone companies, between a telephone company or
companies and a county commission or commissions, or between
the department of public safety and any of the foregoing entities
concerning an emergency telephone system or systems or an
enhanced emergency telephone system or systems, the public
service commission, upon application by such county
commission, telephone company, or department of public safety,
1108

Il at Syl. PL 2.

1109

457 S.E.2d 543 (W. Va. 1995).

1110

Il at Syl. PL 3.

1111

473 S.E.2d 141 (W. Va. 1996).
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shall resolve such conflict, pursuant to W.Va. Code, o 24-6-7
[1989]. However, neither W.Va. Code, 24-6-7 [1989] nor W.Va.
Code, 24-6-la [1988] authorizes the public service commission to
resolve conflicts which arise between a county commission and a
municipality concerning an emergency telephone system or
systems 11or2 an enhanced emergency telephone system or
systems.
The court concluded in Kenova that
[u]nder the plain language of W.Va. Code, 24-6-5 [1989], an
enhanced emergency telephone system, at a minimum, shall
provide, inter alia, that all the territory in the county, including
every municipal corporation in the county, which is served by
telephone company central office equipment that will permit
such
1 3
a system to be established shall be included in the system. 1
In Jackson v. Donahue,1114 Justice McHugh addressed issues involving

self-insured foreign commercial trucking companies. The court noted that "[tjhe
phrase 'self-insurance' means, generally, the assumption of one's own risk and,
typically, involves the setting aside of a special fund to meet losses and pay valid
claims, instead of insuring against such losses and claims through an insurance
policy." 111 5 The court then stated that
[u]nder the law of this State, a foreign commercial trucking
corporation, which has been granted authority by the West
Virginia Public Service Commission to self-insure under W.Va.
Code, 24A-5-5(g) [1961], must afford, as a self-insurer, the same
coverage under the West Virginia motor vehicle omnibus clause
statutes, W.Va.

Code, 33-6-31(a) [1982], and W.Va. Code,

17D-4-12(b)(2) [1991], for 11
the6 protection of the public, as would a
liability insurance contract.
Justice McHugh concluded in Jackson that
[a] foreign commercial trucking corporation operating in interstate
commerce pursuant to a federal regulatory scheme, which
provides federal minimum limits of liability coverage, is not

1112

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1113

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1114
1115

457 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1116

Id. at Syl. PL 2.
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subject to the limits set forth in W.Va. Code, 17D-4-2 [1979],
concerning this State's financial responsibility provisions, even
though the corporation was granted authority
to self-insure by the
1117
West Virginia Public Service Commission.

M.

Police Civil Service Commission

Martin v. Pugh1118 required Justice McHugh to address several issues
concerning appointment of police officers under the Police Civil Service Act. It
was held initially that "W.Va. Code, 8-14-15 [1969], requires an average score to
be calculated and utilized for each candidate who takes the competitive
examination for a police civil service position on more than one occasion during
the three years next preceding the date of the prospective appointment.""'1 9 Justice
McHugh next held that "[t]he burden of proof is upon a candidate for appointment
to a police civil service position to show that other candidates having higher
average examination scores are no longer available for appointment for one or
more of the reasons set forth in W.Va. Code, 8-14-14 and -15 [1969]. ' ' 112 in
Martin, the court then ruled that "[t]here must be strict compliance with the Police
Civil Service Act, W.Va. Code, 8-14-6 to -23, and de facto appointments, based
upon mere performance of duties as a police officer, are not contemplated under
such Act." 1121 Justice McHugh concluded in Martin that
[w]here a candidate for appointment to a police civil service
position does not satisfy the requirements of W.Va. Code, 8-14-15
[1969] for inclusion in the list of certified eligibles, is not so
certified by the policemen's civil service commission, and is not
selected by the appointing officer from such list, his purported
"appointment" in any other manner is void ab initio, and the
municipality is not estopped from subsequently resisting his
efforts to obtain
recognition of his status pursuant to the void
11 2
appointment.
Justice McHugh clarified the weight to be accorded statutory criteria for
promotion within the ranks of police departments in the case of Bays v. Police Civil
Service Commission, City of Charleston."23 The court stated:

1117

IL at Syl. Pt. 3.

1118

334 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1985).

1119

Id. at Syl. Pt.2.

1120

ld.
at Syl. Pt.3.

1121

Id.at Syl. Pt. 4.

1122

3

1123

at Syl. Pt.5.
364 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1987).
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The Police Civil Service Act, in particular, W.Va. Code, 8-14-17,
as amended, requires that the promotions of individuals
thereunder are to be based upon merit and fitness to be ascertained
by competitive written examination and upon the superior
qualifications of the individuals promoted, as shown by their
previous service and experience. One of these test factors, in itself,
is not an adequate determinant of the applicant's merit and fitness;
therefore, it should not be considered to the exclusion of the
others. Accordingly, regulations of a police civil service
commission
which conflict with the statute on this point are
24
void.' 1
Justice McHugh scrutinized questionable promotional criteria in the case
of Habursky v. Recht."125 The court stated that
[a] rule of a police civil service commission basing seniority
points, for the purpose of promotion, upon "years of in-grade
service" is invalid, as it is too restrictive and conflicts with W.Va.
Code, 8-14-17, as amended, which requires consideration of
"previous service and experience." An "in-grade" service credit
rule is invalid also when it conflicts with an existing,
city-approved regulation of a police civil service
commission
1126
which requires consideration of "years of service."
Justice

McHugh

observed

in Mason v.

City of Welch"127

that

"[p]arking-meter attendants are not 'members of a paid police department' as
defined in W.Va. Code, 8-14-6 [1969] and are, therefore, not
covered by the Police
'' 12
Civil Service Act, W.Va. Code, 8-14-6 to -23, as amended."
Justice McHugh held in Echard v. City of Parkersburg'1 29 that "[e]ntry of
an order by a policemen's civil service commission takes place when entered in an
order book of the policemen's civil service commission and dated by the recorder
of the city."" 3 0
N.

Division of Water Resources
In Rayle Coal Co. v. Chief; Division of Water Resources, State Department

1124

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1125

375 S.E.2d 760 (W. Va. 1988).

1126

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1127

375 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1988).

1128

Id. at Syl.

1129

419 S.E.2d 14 (W. Va. 1992).

1130

Id. at Syl. PL 2.
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of NaturalResources,1131 Justice McHugh stated:
According to W.Va. Code, 20-5A-5(b), as amended, an application
for a water pollution control permit is required whenever there is a
discharge of any amount of "pollutant," treated or untreated, from
a "point source" into the "waters" of this state, as these terms are
defined in W.Va. Code, 20-5A-2, as amended." 3 2
The court also held that "[t]he West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act,
W.Va. Code, 20-5A-1 to 20-5A-24, as amended, requires an application for a
permit when the cessation of business operations does not stop the pollution. '" " 33
0.

Water Development Authority

Justice McHugh addressed the ability of the Water Development Authority
to impose service charges on public service districts in the case of State ex rel.
Water Development Authority v. Northern Wayne County Public Service
District."34 The court held:
W.Va. Code, 22C-1-7 [1994] authorizes the Water Development
Authority to directly impose on a public service district, which
operates a public utility as defined inW.Va. Code, 24-1-2 [1979],
"in its own name and for its own benefit service charges
determined by it to be necessary" when the public service district
defaults on a loan made by the Water Development Authority to
the public service district. However, the Water Development
Authority's power to impose such service charges upon the public
service district which operates a public utility is subject to the
regulatory review and approval of the Public Service Commission
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 24-2-1 [1991]."3
P.

Division of NaturalResources

In State ex rel. Hamrick v. LCS Services, Inc.,"1 36 Justice McHugh
commented upon the right of the Division of Natural Resources to litigate a matter
in state court that evolved out of a federal proceeding. The court held initially:

1131

401 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1990).

1132

Id.at Syl. Pt. 1.

1133

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1134

464 S.E.2d 777 (W.Va. 1995).

1135

Id. at Syl. PL 5.

1136

414 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1992).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 20
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

When a federal district court orders the state Division of Natural
Resources (DNR) to comply with state permit procedures for a
solid waste facility which were in effect on February 3, 1988, and
which procedures on that date required only a permit from state
DNR authorities, but subsequent to that date, the legislature enacts
new provisions, W.Va. Code, 20-5F-4a, as amended, and W.Va.
Code, 20-9-12b, as amended, which require a certificate of site
approval from county or regional solid waste authorities, the DNR
may institute an action in circuit court to adjudicate the issue of
compliance with the requirement for a certificate of site approval
from county or regional solid waste authorities. Because the issue
of the requirement of a certificate of site approval from county or
regional solid waste authorities was not litigated in the federal
district court, it is error for the circuit court to apply principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar litigation seeking to
adjudicate this issue in the circuit court.1137
Justice McHugh then concluded:
When a federal district court orders the state Division of Natural
Resources (DNR) to comply with state permit procedures for a
solid waste facility which were in effect on February 3, 1988, and
which procedures on that date required only a permit from state
DNR authorities, but subsequent to that date, the legislature enacts
a new provision, W.Va. Code, 20-9-12c [1990], which requires
approval by a county commission for the continued handling of
10,000 tons or more of solid waste per month, the DNR may
institute an action in circuit court to adjudicate the issue of
compliance with this requirement. Because the issue of approval
by a county commission for the continued handling of 10,000 tons
or more of solid waste per month was not litigated in the federal
district court, it is error for the circuit court to apply principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel to 13bar
litigation seeking to
8
adjudicate this issue in the circuit court.
Q.

Solid Waste Authority

Justice McHugh was called upon in In re Reitter1 139 to address the
propriety of certain compensation being given to board members of a solid waste
authority. He held:

1137

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1138

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1139

424 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. 1992).
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Under W.Va. Code, 20-9-3 [1991], members of a solid waste
authority shall not receive compensation for their services thereon,
except for actual expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties.
Therefore, an employer of a member of a solid waste authority
may not be reimbursed for the wages and benefits paid to that
board member while he or she is performing duties for the solid
waste authority during his or her scheduled hours of employment
with the employer.114 °
R.

Departmentof Highways

In State ex rel. Keene v. Jordan,1141 Justice McHugh determined whether
department of highway agents could be subject to criminal prosecution for carrying
out lawful orders. The court held that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 17-4-1 [1972] the State Commissioner
of Highways has exclusive authority and control over state roads.
Therefore, a city official may not interfere with the legitimate
authority of the State Department of Highways by criminally
prosecuting, under a municipal ordinance, a state employee and an
employee of a railroad company for closing a railroad crossing
which was under
the authority and control of the State Department
1142
of Highways.
S.

Board of Medicine

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of discovery during a proceeding
before the board of medicine in the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Smith.1143 He
held:
Pursuant to the West Virginia Medical Practice Act set forth in
W.Va. Code, 30-3-1 et seq. and the regulations promulgated by the
Board of Medicine pursuant to W.Va. Code, 30-3-1 et seq. found
in 11 CSR 1A-1 et seq., discovery depositions are not expressly or
implicitly authorized in a disciplinary proceeding before the Board
of Medicine. Furthermore, the due process clause found in article
HI, 10 of the Constitution of West Virginia does not mandate that
discovery be accorded to a physician in a disciplinary proceeding
unless there are particular circumstances which would make it
fundamentally unfair to refuse to allow the physician to conduct
1140

Id at Syl.

1141

451 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1994).

1142

Id at Syl.

1143

482 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1997).
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discovery prior to the hearing in the disciplinary proceeding. In
such event the physician may obtain subpoenas
for purposes of
44
obtaining pre-hearing discovery depositions."
T.

ConcurrentJurisdiction

Justice McHugh addressed matters involving concurrent jurisdiction
between courts and administrative agencies in State ex rel. Bell Atlantic-West
Virginia,Inc. v. Ranson."1 45 The court held that

[w]here an administrative agency and the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of an issue which requires the agency's special
expertise and which extends beyond the conventional experience
of judges, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. In such a
case, the court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction until
after the agency has resolved the issue. The court's decision
whether to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is reviewed on
1 46
appeal under an abuse of discretion standard."
Justice McHugh then stated that
[i]n determining whether to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, courts should consider factors such as whether the
question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges;
whether the question at issue lies peculiarly within the agency's
discretion or requires the exercise of agency expertise; whether
there exists a danger of inconsistent rulings;
and whether a prior
1 47
application to the agency has been made."
U.

JudicialReview UnderAdministrative ProcedureAct

Justice McHugh articulated the standard of review by circuit courts under
the Administrative Procedure Act in the case of Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire
Dept. v. State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission.1 48 The

court held that

[u]pon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia
Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section
4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or decision of the
1144

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1145

497 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1997).
Id. at Syl. Ptl.

1146

1147

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1148

309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).
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agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit
court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the
agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have
been-prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, decisions or order are: "(1) In violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon
unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5)
Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse 49of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion." 1
XVII. INSURANCE LAW

A.

InterpretingPolicy Language

In Helfeldt v. Robinson,1150 Justice McHugh was forced to determine the
effect of an exception to exclusion in a liability policy that was voided by other
exclusions in the policy. The court held:
Although an exclusion in a comprehensive general automobile and
property liability insurance contract contained an exception for
"warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's products or
a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the named
insured will be done in a workmanlike manner," that exception to
the contract's exclusion provision did not extend insurance
coverage to a contractor for the defective construction of a home
where the insurance contract contained other exclusions
precluding insurance coverage and the insurance contract in
question
was a liability insurance policy and not a builder's risk
115
policy.
In Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.," 52 the court held that
"[t]he term 'occurrence' in a limitation of liability clause within an automobile
liability insurance policy refers unmistakably to the resulting event for which the
insured becomes liable and not to some antecedent cause(s) of the injury."" 5 3

1149

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1150

290 S.E.2d 896 (W. Va. 1981).

1151

Id. at Syl.

1152

332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).

1153

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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